# Phil ROB

The counter-role of the ballot is that we should debate goodness and badness from the perspective of an ethical theory that purports to be a complete account of the moral obligation of the actor in question. Prefer:

**One,** Framework provides a moral baseline to understand the issues of the K. Just as you cannot measure with a ruler of constantly changing length, you need a fixed standard to measure moral progress and see if we’re even headed in the right direction. The complexities of oppression e.g. intersectionality, tradeoffs, aggregation etc. require a more robust account of moral theory. Only philosophy contextualizes what is *constitutive* of oppression and resolves complex questions of how to resist it.

**Two,** Our current understanding of oppression will only guide us toward finite, familiar solutions—philosophy challenges that dogmatism and enlarges our thoughts.

#### Russell[[1]](#footnote-1)

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The [person] man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become[s] definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge[s] our thoughts and free[s] them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value -- perhaps its chief value -- through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive [person] is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleagured fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.

Three, Principles like equality and liberty are the philosophical principles that justify why oppression is important—otherwise, we don’t debate about the true source of your movement and can’t empower it since it doesn’t have the legitimacy as a rational principle but merely an assertion.

Four, You don’t provide a framework for why oppression [or oppression of the queer body is the worst harm]—even if you think this is obviously true, he needs to justify it so that it’s something that *can* be called into question. Every ethical assumption we make cannot be hidden, and must be justified. Unjustified assumptions is the root cause of all oppression, because it perpetuates the logic of acceptance without question because someone has commanded them.

#### Giroux[[2]](#footnote-2)

Simply put, educators need to cast a critical eye onthoseforms of knowledge and social relations that define themselves through a conceptual purity and political innocence that not only clouds how they come into being, but also ignores that the alleged neutrality on which they stand is already grounded in ethico-political choices. Neutral, objective education is an oxymoron. It does not exist outside of relations of power, values and politics.

Five, Your claim that the judge ought to adopt some sort of position presumes an appeal to normative concepts and ideas like the constitutive role of the judge - you cannot divorce the principles behind your ROB from the philosophy that underpins it.

Six, A rejection of philosophy throws away our best weapon in combating the exact problems he points out. Fichte, a student of Kant, proved this as he found himself unable to act on his anti-Semitic beliefs due to his belief in the Categorical Imperative and subsequently became a staunch defender of Jewish rights.

#### Sweet[[3]](#footnote-3)

But Fichte's anti-Semitism, as expressed in these passages, is not in question. In fact the most extreme expression of it, though not in the brutal language of the Beitrag, was not published until 1990, too late for Rose to be aware of it. Dating from 1807, Fichte here unveiled a vision of a Grossdeutschland from which Jews should emigrate unless they became fully assimilated (entweder verschmolzen oder ausgewandert). "They have a highly interesting state in Palistina," he noted.6 Very significant for Fichte's attitude toward actual Jews in the flesh, however, was the sharp distinction he drew, already in the Beitrag of 1793, between civil rights and human rights. Civil rights should not be granted them, for in that case, he wrote, with the irrational exaggeration and prejudice to which he was prone, "the rest of you citizens would be trampled under foot." Despite such sentiments, and much as he hated Judaism as an intellectual presence, so long as Jews were living among Germans, he insisted, their human rights must be protected, for they are Menschen and if one of them hungered he should be given bread. Amidst the crude expressions of antipathy to "Jewish ideas," Fichte voiced strong repugnance to the tormenting of Jews as a violation of their human rights. "I have often," he wrote, "at danger to myself given protection to Jews who were being harassed."7 And during the period October 1811 - April 1812, when he was rector of [At] the University of Berlin, he was repudiated by virtually the entire faculty because he insisted on justice for a Jewish student in incidents involving violations of the student's human rights. Fichte thereupon resigned as rector.

# ROB Collapses to Kant

Your role of the ballot collapses to the Neg standard of respecting liberty. The K only highlights a valuable end but the Neg is a constraint to what means you can use.

Prefer this recontextualization:

**One,** Individual agents are incapable of securing the means to their willed ends, because the government and other agents may violate your liberty to do so. To will anything independent the standard is a contradiction, because in willing any end you will the necessary means to that end. Hence you must will a system of respecting liberty [because only under that system could an agent have sufficient means to secure their ends].

**Two,** Consequentialist ethics is always worse under the role of the ballot because it can never commit itself to the position that some things are always bad. It would say that sexual assault would be justified in certain circumstances when it generates positive consequences. Kantian ethics are better because it accepts that certain acts of violence are intrinsically wrong.

**And,** Kantian ethics are uniquely emancipatory—it demands intersubjectivity and consideration of others’ ends.

#### Farr 02[[4]](#footnote-4)

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement [is] may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy [is] a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.

[This solves your abstraction offense] Even if we have concrete differences based in particular circumstances, we still have ourselves in common—that is the only way to counter oppressive ideologies.

Kantian studies are vital for gender equality.

#### Hay**[[5]](#footnote-5)**

**Kant's defense of the** ultimate **moral importance of our rational nature is something that feminists cannot** afford to **ignore**. This is because, as we will see in detail in Chapter 4, harms to one's rational nature are among the worst harms an oppressed person can face. It is critically important for feminists to have something to say about why **harms to women's rational capacities are seriously morally problematic** because these harms are among the most egregious problems that arise from women's oppression. […] Kantianism gives us a way to explain what is wrong with these harms. Despite what Kant himself might have thought, we know that women's rational capacities are no different from men's. Thus, we know that **women are just as deserving** of respect as men. And we know that the respect that women are owed **in virtue of their rational capacities** is incompatible with the harms to women's rationality that can result from oppression. Feminists therefore have good reason to take Kantianism seriously since **Kant's work** on rationality **gives us the conceptual tools to make sense of what is wrong with** some of the worst harms of **sexist oppression.** But Kantianism is hardly the only moral framework that has the resources to explain what is wrong with harming women's rational capacities. What then, precisely, is the baby feminists risk throwing out with the Kantian bathwater?88 The baby, I hope it is clear by now, is the Kantian duty of self-respect. Because Kant provides such a **robust account of duties to the self, his account is** unparalleled in its ability to fully explain the moral importance of self-respect. We will see next that his account is also **unparalleled in its ability to condemn** certain **gendered norms** of self-sacrifice.

# AT Phil is Western/oppressive

1. Philosophy is inescapable—all decisions we make in life are normative ones that can only be justified philosophically. Ethics cannot be categorically racist, but it can be done poorly, because we all DO ask and answer those questions implicitly every time we make a decision in life. It’s try-or-die for philosophy. [Obviously yes, some have been excluded from morality—this means some philosophers haven’t been using philosophy *right* but not that philosophy itself is intrinsically bad—there’s a distinction between something’s *content* and its *application*—that’s just another reason why we need ethics right now in order to practice it better.]
2. Whole-to-part fallacy [aka fallacy of division]—just because there is a *general* epistemic limitation does not mean the particular inferences of the Neg are problematic. For example, a corporation may be capitalist but its employees may not be; water is wet but its individual atoms aren’t.
3. The *source* of an idea does not dictate the truth of the idea itself. Someone bad at math could still occasionally come up with a solution. You must point out where the error lies, not just a general tendency to error.
4. Hasty generalization—this may be true for many questions, but not all—obviously some Western thought is still true, such as mathematical theories about trigonometry. Assessing the adequacy of the generalization means you must win a deficit to my specific reasoning.
5. This denies the antecedent—showing “if Western, then flawed” may mean that my framework is flawed but showing that yours *isn’t* Western doesn’t get you to the right framework. There could still be plenty of equally problematic errors at play.

# AT Abstraction/Ideal Theory

1. Your arguments are abstract/ideal as well, two warrants—a) they appeal to some abstract principal like human equality or integrity to warrant the motivating **intuition** behind your position, and b) they make a **universal** judgment on how we ought to engage in moral reasoning and set up an absolute prohibition against ideal theory, just as Kant sets up a prohibition on liberty violations.
2. Ideals are inevitable to any human project—it’s most dangerous to those who have not yet deliberated on ideals—we must engage in philosophical learning as training.

#### Chesterton[[6]](#footnote-6)

There are people, however, who dig somewhat deeper than this into the possible evils of dogma. It is felt by many that strong philosophical conviction, while it does not (as they perceive) produce that sluggish and fundamentally frivolous condition which we call bigotry, does produce a certain concentration, exaggeration, and moral impatience, which we may agree to call fanaticism. They [who] say, in brief, that ideas are dangerous things. In politics, for example, it is commonly urged against a man like Mr. Balfour, or against a man like Mr. John Morley, that a wealth of ideas is dangerous. The true doctrine on this point, again, is surely not very difficult to state. Ideas are dangerous, but the [person] man to whom [ideas] they are least dangerous is the [person] man of ideas. [They are] He is acquainted with ideas, and moves among them like a lion-tamer. Ideas are dangerous, but the [person] man to whom they are most dangerous is the [person] man of no ideas. [They] The man of no ideas will find the first idea fly to his head like wine to the head of a teetotaller. It is a common error, I think, among the Radical idealists of my own party and period to suggest that financiers and business men are a danger to the empire because they are so sordid or so materialistic. The truth is that financiers and business men are a danger to the empire because they can be sentimental about any sentiment, and idealistic about any ideal, any ideal that they find lying about. just as a boy who has not known much of women is apt too easily to take a woman for the woman, so these practical men, unaccustomed to causes, are always inclined to think that if a thing is proved to be an ideal it is proved to be the ideal. Many, for example, avowedly followed Cecil Rhodes because he had a vision. They might as well have followed him because he had a nose; a man without some kind of dream of perfection is quite as much of a monstrosity as a noseless man. People say of such a figure, in almost feverish whispers, "He knows his own mind," which is exactly like saying in equally feverish whispers, "He blows his own nose." Human nature simply cannot subsist without a hope and aim of some kind; as the sanity of the Old Testament truly said, where there is no vision the people perisheth. But it is precisely because an ideal is necessary to man that the [person] man without ideals is in permanent danger of fanaticism. There is nothing which is so likely to leave a man open to the sudden and irresistible inroad of an unbalanced vision as the cultivation of business habits. All of us know angular business men who think that the earth is flat, or that Mr. Kruger was at the head of a great military despotism, or that men are graminivorous, or that Bacon wrote Shakespeare. Religious and philosophical beliefs are, indeed, as dangerous as fire, and nothing can take from them that beauty of danger. But there is only one way of really guarding ourselves against the excessive danger of them, and that is to be steeped in philosophy and soaked in religion.

This creates a uniqueness question—idealism is inevitable so we should carefully choose our ideals, so we don't end up idealizing things which cannot hold the brunt of a world view.

## AT Mills

No link to abstraction—abstraction is harmful not in its normative claims but in assuming deviations from the actual. The NC merely provides a normative framework but does not involve idealization to the *exclusion* of the actual—actually read the book.

#### Mills

Let us begin by differentiating various senses of ideal, since the ambiguities and multiple interpretations of the term partially contribute, in my opinion, to whatever superficial plausibility “ideal theory” may have as an approach. To start with, of course, in a trivial sense “ideal” theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics). Since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, as against factual/descriptive issues, and so involves the appeal to values and ideals, it is obviously ideal theory in that generic sense, regardless of any divergence in approaches taken. Call this uncontroversial background normative sense of the ideal [is], with which we will not be concern[ing]ed: ideal-as-normative. Central to our focus, by contrast, is a different sense of ideal—ideal as model. Call this ideal-as-model. Obviously, this sense is not at all peculiar to ethics, but can be found in other branches of philosophy, and is indeed shared more generally (if not usually in quite the same way) with both natural and social science. Imagine some phenomenon of the natural or social world, P. Then an ideal in this sense is a representation of P. One kind of representation purports to be descriptive of P’s crucial aspects (its essential nature) and how it actually works (its basic dynamic). Call this descriptive modeling sense: ideal-as-descriptive-model. Since a model [that] is not coincident with what it is modeling, of course, an ideal-as-descriptive-model necessarily has to abstract[s] away from certain features of [the natural world] P. So one will make simplifying assumptions, based on what one takes the most important features of P to be, and include certain features while omitting others: this will produce a schematized picture of the actual workings and actual nature of P. But for certain P (not all), it will also be possible to produce an idealized model, an exemplar, of what an ideal P should be like. Call this idealized model ideal-as-idealized-model. Unless the P in question is itself an ideal P, then obviously a gap will exist between it and the ideal, and correspondingly between ideal-as-descriptive-model (an ideal—in the sense of accurate—model of how P actually works) and ideal-as-idealized-model (an ideal—in the sense of an exemplar—model of how P should work). And obviously the “should” here will in general not necessarily be a moral “should,” but may involve norms of a technical functionalist kind (an ideal vacuum cleaner, an ideal concentration camp, an ideal digestive system, and so on) or just limiting assumptions convenient for the purposes of mathematization and calculation (an ideal gas, a perfect vacuum, a frictionless plane, a resistance-free conductor). Now in trying to understand the workings of an actual, how useful will it be to start from an ideal-as-idealized-model of P? Obviously, this question cannot be answered a priori: it’s going to depend on how closely the actual in question approximates the behavior of an ideal P. A very smooth, Teflon-coated plane suspended in a vacuum may come close enough that one can regard its behavior as approaching that of an ideal frictionless plane: ideal-as-descriptive-model here will approximate, if falling a bit short of, ideal-as-idealized-model. So one can think of ideal-as-idealized-model as an extrapolation, in the limit, of the behavior of P (here the plane), or from the other direction, regard ideal-as-descriptive-model as just being slightly deviant from this ideal. But if the plane is covered not with Teflon, but Velcro, or is pitted, cracked, and abraded in various ways, then obviously this would be absurd. Ideal-as-descriptive-model, the model of the actual workings of the plane, will be quite different from ideal-as-idealized-model, and one will need to start with an actual investigation of the plane’s properties; one cannot just conceptualize them in terms of a minor deviation from the ideal, ideal-as-idealized-model. And if one wants to change the actual P so it conforms more closely in its behavior to the ideal, one will need to work and theorize not merely with the ideal, ideal-as-idealized-model, but with the nonideal, ideal-as-descriptive-model, so as to identify and understand the peculiar features that explain P’s dynamic and prevent it from attaining ideality. Let us now turn (doubtless to the relief of readers) from these mechanical comparisons to what we’re really interested in: the application of these distinctions to human interaction and moral theory. Since we’re dealing with moral agents and not gases, planes, or vacuum cleaners, the ideal in the ideal-as-idealized-model sense has here, of course, a crucial moral dimension along with the factual one. Factually, idealization involves the attribution to the agents (as conceived of in the theory) of human capacities significantly deviant from the norm; for example, their degrees of rationality [or], self-knowledge, ability to make interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons, and the like (O’Neill 1987, 56). Morally, idealization involves the modeling of what people should be like (character), how they should treat each other (right and good actions), and how society should be structured in its basic institutions (justice). Different theorists will, of course, diverge on what these ideals are, and correspondingly, on their views of what ideal character, the relation between the right and the good, and the nature of a just society consist in. But they will have in common an ideal of some sort. Now what distinguishes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals, since obviously nonideal theory can and will use ideals also (certainly it will appeal to the moral ideals, if it may be more dubious about the value of invoking idealized human capacities). What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on [but] idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual. As O’Neill emphasizes, this is not a necessary corollary of the operation of abstraction itself, since one can have abstractions of the ideal-as-descriptive-model type that abstract without idealizing. But ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it. Ideal theory as an approach will then utilize as its basic apparatus some or all of the following concepts and assumptions (there is necessarily a certain overlap in the list, since they all intersect with one another):

# AT Winter and Leighton

1. Circular justification—you use the importance of including others in our ethical lens to explain why we have to minimize structural violence. That begs the question of the entirety of your normative presuppositions about why structural violence is intrinsically and non-derivatively bad. *[The reason including others is important is that absent their inclusion, they may suffer violence. In effect you say to minimize structural violence because otherwise others will suffer structural violence.]*
2. If all ethics are cognitively biased then you cannot escape that, since you do not know what is unbiased. You cannot argue from an objective outside view of moral phenomenology if you deny the possibility of that objectivity. Biased cognition is inevitable—hence the best we can do is aim to have good biases, which can only be determined via some ethical framework e.g. bias against Trump supporters is probably better than bias against blacks.
3. The NC framework avoids this problem because it includes everyone—the Farr evidence shows that the *best* way to include others is through Kantianism, which requires intersubjectivity and consideration of our common humanity.

# AT Curry

1. You haven’t shown a tradeoff between ideal theory and practical solutions—my argument is that we need both. It’s not to say that social problems are *totalizable* by theories but rather that we need a framework first to even know if the “practical solutions” that Curry wants are good ones.

# AT Other ROB Warrants

**AT Classroom space comparison**

1. Debate is a competition, not a classroom—we don't award students ballots in the classroom. Competitive ballot focus means it's bad as a teaching tool because debaters get entrenched in a single mindset when they’re pit in opposition to each other. This **turns** your role of the ballot—it only makes building resistance strategies harder.
2. Your evidence speaks to how scholars and teachers should conduct themselves, not how students should appropriate spaces and deconstruct them on their own. We're just high school students—rather than discussing comprehensive policy legislative processes we should instead focus on value-framed generalities.

**AT Oppression is always bad / gut check**

1. Yes, I agree—the demand for a framework is not to impact turn oppression but rather to develop a more robust account to address complex, real-world problems.
2. Even if oppression is always bad, it’s a question of strength of link—we cannot resolve which harms to oppression are worse absent appealing to a more robust ethical framework.

**AT Judges are educators**

1. No, judges are arbitrators. The role of a judge as educators presumes unjustified theoretical appeals to education.
2. **Turn:** Even if education is the most important role of the judge, that’s just a reason why post-fiat philosophy debate is even better since we gain new critical thinking and skills at justifying our beliefs.
3. Debate is subject to so many artificial constraints like time limits and speech structure that it begs the question of why we ought to even appeal to what we will do.

**AT Hyper-specific role of the ballot**

1. **Turn:** Positing the role of the ballot as rejecting a specific type of oppression is bad since you artificially remove discussion of other forms of structural violence. Allowing the linkage of more offense through comprehensive ethical theories is the best way to broaden the scope of our debate.

**AT Change can happen**

1. Any chance that you become a future policy maker is non-verifiable.

1. ## Bertrand Russell. The Problems of Philosophy. Chapter XV: The Value of Philosophy. <http://skepdic.com/russell.html>

   [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Henry A. Giroux. “Public Spaces, Private Lives: Democracy Beyond 9/11.” Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Paul Sweet. "Fichte and the Jews: A Case of Tension between Civil Rights and Human Rights." German Studies Review. Vol. 16, No. 1. Feb 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Arnold Farr [Professor of philosophy at University of Kentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy]. “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. Vol. 33, No. 1. Spring 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. KANTIANISM, Liberalism; and Feminism Resisting Oppression Carol Hay University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Gilbert K. Chesterton. “Heretics.” John Lane Company. 1905. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)